Com a imposição dos tectos salariais anuais de $500000 aos gestores de instituições americanas que recebam bailout money, Obama e a administração americana correm um sério risco de tornar os corpos gerentes dessas empresas num reflexo do nível de brilhantismo que grassa na nossa representação parlamentar na Assembleia da República.
Sobre o assunto, ler também o que acertadamente diz o Nobel Gary Becker:
The main problem with wage (and price) controls is that they never work, although governments have imposed them throughout history. They will not work in this case either, where the plan includes a salary cap of $500,000 for top executives at companies taking “extraordinary assistance” from the federal government, restrictions on when these executives can cash in the stock they will receive, limits to their severance pay, and monitoring of fringe benefits, like company jets. There are no good guides to a priori setting of either the form or the level of compensation to employees in any occupation, including top executives. Competition, with all its defects (which I discuss later), is still the best mechanism available for setting salaries and other prices.
Pay caps will encourage companies that take government aid to hire high priced lawyers and accountants to devote their expensive time trying to find loopholes in these caps. Loopholes include reclassifying some employees to positions below top executives so that their pay would not be subject to any government pay caps. Most loopholes center on various forms of deferred payments and non-monetary benefits. For example, companies started to provide free medical coverage to its employees during World War II as a way to circumvent controls over wages.
Companies that take government assistance do so because they fear going bankrupt. Sometimes that is because they were badly managed by the CEOs and other executives in charge. What many of these companies need are new executives who can take a fresh look at their problems. Unfortunately, pay caps that leave total pay considerably below what able executives receive in other companies make it more difficult to attract these executives to companies in distress because they can earn more, and work with considerably less government interference, in companies that do not take or need aid.