Em respostas às críticas da AECOPS, José Sá Fernandes afirmou que as restrições que pretende impor são prática corrente noutras cidades (se não me engano citou Paris e New York). Logicamente, convém que também tenha presente (ele e os entusiastas da medida) os efeitos que esta produziu.
“Housing” por Benjamin Powell and Edward Stringham (incluido em “The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics“, editado por David Henderson, Liberty Fund)
Inclusionary zoning (…) refers to price controls on a percentage of new homes. Builders and subsequent owners are forced to sell the homes so they are “affordable” to specific income levels. For example, in Tiburon, California, the median price of existing homes is more than $1 million, but builders are required to sell 10 percent of new homes for $109,825 or less. Inclusionary zoning is most popular in California, Maryland, and New Jersey. A nationwide 1991 survey found that nine percent of cities larger than 100,000 had inclusionary zoning, and the number is increasing rapidly. In 1990, roughly thirty jurisdictions in California had inclusionary zoning; the number has increased to more than one hundred today.
Inclusionary zoning produces all the negative effects of price controls. Price controls restrict the supply of new homes and actually make housing less affordable. Because builders are forced to sell a portion of a development at a loss, inclusionary zoning functions as a tax on new construction. Estimates of the level of the tax in California cities such as Portola Valley are over $200,000 per market-rate home. To maintain normal profit margins, builders end up passing the tax onto landowners and other homebuyers. Elasticities of supply and demand determine exactly how the burden is split, but the result is almost certainly higher home prices.
Not only does inclusionary zoning lead to higher prices, but also it leads to less construction. In the 45 San Francisco Bay Area cities with data available, new construction fell by 31 percent in the year following the adoption of inclusionary zo ning (Powell and Stringham 2004). In some cases, inclusionary zoning halts development completely. The experience of Watsonville, California, illustrates this effect. In 1990 Watsonville’s inclusionary zoning ordinance imposed price controls on 25 percent of new homes. Between 1990 and 1999, with the exception of a few small non-profit developments, almost no new construction occurred.
The law was finally revised in 1999 because, in the words of Watsonville Mayor Judy Doering-Nielsen, “There was an incredible pent-up demand. Our inclusionary housing ordinance was so onerous that developers wouldn’t come in.” Jan Davison, the Redevelopment and Housing Department Director, commented, “It [the inclusionary zoning law] was so stringent, and land costs were so high, that few units were produced,” but “It was completely redone in 2000, and we got more units produced” (Morgan, 2003). Watsonville reduced the number of units under price controls from 25 percent of all developments to 15 percent on smaller developments and 20 percent on developments of 50 units or more. In the three years after easing requirements, the city’s housing stock increased by 12 percent.
Nota: Recomendo a leitura integral do artigo, em especial as pp 4 a 7.